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The way we think about ourselves impacts greatly on our behavior. This paper describes
a behavioral study and a computational model that shed new light on this important area.
Participants were primed “clever” and “stupid” using a scrambled sentence task, and we
measured the effect on response time and error-rate on a rule-association task. First, we
observed a confirmation bias effect in that associations to being “stupid” led to a gradual
decrease in performance, whereas associations to being “clever” did not. Second, we
observed that the activated self-concepts selectively modified attention toward one’s per-
formance. There was an early to late double dissociation in RTs in that primed “clever”
resulted in RT increase following error responses, whereas primed “stupid” resulted in
RT increase following correct responses. We propose a computational model of subjects’
behavior based on the logic of the experimental task that involves two processes; memory
for rules and the integration of rules with subsequent visual cues. The model incorpo-
rates an adaptive decision threshold based on Bayes rule, whereby decision thresholds
are increased if integration was inferred to be faulty. Fitting the computational model to
experimental data confirmed our hypothesis that priming affects the memory process.
This model explains both the confirmation bias and double dissociation effects and demon-
strates that Bayesian inferential principles can be used to study the effect of self-concepts
on behavior.
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1. INTRODUCTION
High self-esteem is characterized by thinking well of oneself,
whether it is a true or distorted appreciation. Low self-esteem
denotes a less consistent and more uncertain regard about one’s
abilities (Campbell, 1990). Self-esteem is the evaluative dimension
of self-concepts (Harter and Baumeister, 1993). Taking a cognitive
architectural approach of personality, self-concepts can be viewed
as knowledge structures of attributes of oneself formed from expe-
rience and organized as any other mental concept (Markus, 1977;
Cervone et al., 2004). They are used to guide the processing of self-
relevant information (Kelly, 1955; Markus, 1977), and emerging
evidence shows that the way we think about ourselves impacts on
aspects such as depression (Harter and Baumeister, 1993), obesity
(Ternouth et al., 2009), school performance (Spinath et al., 2006),
and criminal behavior (Trzesniewski et al., 2006).
Functional neuroimaging studies have consistently highlighted
processes of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) as part
of reflecting upon one’s own character (for a review, see Amodio
and Frith, 2006). Enhanced activation is seen when participants
judge whether or not traits apply to themselves as compared to
when they make judgments about others’ character (Kelley et al.,
2002; Mitchell et al., 2002) and subsequently when the traits are
high as compared to low in self-relevance (Moran et al., 2006).
Furthermore, Macrae et al. (2004) showed that high activation in
the aMPFC when judging self-relevant traits resulted in better rec-
ollection when debriefed after the experiment of which adjectives
had been presented. Bengtsson et al. (2009) found that this area
is sensitive to task instructions that make participants specifically
monitor their own performance. When told that the task they took
was a measure of their ability there was enhanced neural activa-
tion in aMPFC when the participants made errors, compared to
a group who were told that the task they took was a piloting task.
Task difficulty was titrated so that accuracy was matched between
the two groups.
Stored in long-term memory, the concept of self may not
change extensively over an individual’s lifespan (Marcus and
Kunda, 1986; Campbell, 1990). However, the influence of self-
concepts on behavior will vary depending on applicability and
accessibility of the knowledge structures to the task the individual
is encountering (Higgins, 1990). This is exemplified in priming
studies where, e.g., priming for “old” makes people more likely
to walk slower down the corridor than they would otherwise
do (Bargh et al., 1996), or when primed with associations to
“professor” people become more likely to score highly on a quiz
(Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1998). Priming refers to the
passive and unobtrusive activation of relevant mental representa-
tions by environmental stimuli such that people are not and do
not become aware of the influence exerted by those stimuli (Bargh
and Chartrand, 2000). Dual-process models (Smith and DeCoster,
2000; Strack and Deutsch, 2004) stipulate that human behavior is
the result of interactions between automatic/impulsive processes
on the one hand and controlled/reflective processes on the other.
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According to the Strack and Deutsch (2004) model, the Impul-
sive system is a network of associative nodes, with connections
differing in their weight according to how frequently they occur
together. Incoming information is always processed by the impul-
sive system, where the influence of the system on behavior is greatly
determined by the extent of pre-activation of specific connections
in the associative network. The Reflective system, which focuses
attention toward relevant stimuli, is subjected to the individual’s
awareness and control. Goal oriented conflict between the two sys-
tems costs energy, and can impact cognitive performance, such as
results on an IQ-test when conflicts arise between the implicit and
explicit self-concept of intelligence (Dislich et al., 2012).
We have previously found that errors on a subsequent work-
ing memory task take on a different meaning when participants
are primed with associations to “clever” and “stupid.” “Clever”-
priming led to increased activity in aMPFC as well as post-error
slowing in reaction times, whereas “stupid”-priming was followed
by increased activation in insula when the participants made
errors and absence of post-error slowing (Bengtsson et al., 2011).
Rabbitt (1966) suggested that the slowing of responses immedi-
ately after errors is due to the validation of an error, and thus
transient changes in response strategy to minimize the possi-
bility of further errors. This proposal is supported by empir-
ical findings that post-error slowing lowers the probability of
committing a subsequent error in the post-error trial (Rabbitt,
1966; Danielmeier et al., 2011). Thus, our results suggest that
“stupid”-associations led to greater uncertainty as to whether
errors had occurred or not. We further speculated that the results
may reflect a conflict between the implicit self-associations (e.g.,
“clever”) and the explicit self-associations (I’m making an error),
and that in the case of “clever” the post-error slowing reflects a
greater surprise about the outcome. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the model of Notebaert et al. (2009), where they
propose that post-error slowing represents an attention-grasping
(surprising) event. They showed that slowing occurs when the
outcome is rare, rather than to errors in particular. When cor-
rect responses outnumbered error responses, post-error slowing
occurred, whereas when the majority of the trials were incorrect
post-correct slowing was observed. In fact, influential theoreti-
cal models of self-regulation propose that individuals adjust their
behavior so as to minimize the discrepancy between active self-
associations and goals. Carver and Scheier (1998) in their model
have taken inspiration from control theory and propose that the
active self-concept functions as a reference, and in a discrepancy-
reducing feedback loop individuals aim to adjust behavior so
as to minimize the discrepancy between action and the refer-
ence. Similarly, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that
the active self-concept functions as a working memory con-
trol process to filter what self-relevant information to encode in
order to reduce the tension between active self-knowledge and
goals.
The aim of the present study is to test our predictions from
Bengtsson et al. (2011): priming with associations to “clever” leads
participants to treat errors as more surprising than when they
are primed “stupid,” since an error would then generate a larger
discrepancy between expectations and outcome. If this is true,
using the same logic, we would also expect a greater surprise to
correct responses when participants are primed with “stupid”-
associations. We examined these predictions in a behavioral study
using a rule-association task (Crone et al., 2006). Additionally, we
develop a computational model to improve the understanding of
underlying mechanisms. We use Bayesian probability theory to test
if behavior may be regulated based on the probabilistic attribution
of outcomes to a subject’s own abilities. The aim of the model is to
shed light on what we mean by various concepts such as self and
esteem. Previously, Bayesian theory has proven useful in under-
standing brain and behavior on many levels (Doya et al., 2007),
from sensory perception (Ernst and Banks, 2002) to motor learn-
ing (Kording and Wolpert, 2004) and social interaction (Yoshida
et al., 2008) (for a recent review, see Penny, 2012). However, to our
knowledge, there has to date been no research on using Bayesian
inference to probe the mechanisms relating trait-associations to
behavior.
Our model makes the following assumptions (a) that our
behavioral task embodies two processes (i) memory: remembering
a rule for how to behave and (ii) response accumulation: integrat-
ing stimuli with rule memory to produce an appropriate response,
(b) the decision threshold for the response accumulation process,
β, adapts over trials by switching to a higher value if accumula-
tion was inferred to be incorrect on the previous trial, (c) mean
reaction time is proportional to a log-odds ratio (log β/[1−β]),
(d) estimates of memory integrity (the probability of correctly
remembering the rule) are updated over time. Additionally, we
hypothesize that priming affects the memory process and test this
hypothesis by fitting our model to subjects’ behavioral data. This
hypothesis stems from the notion that both working memory and
priming are considered to be top-down processes where they both
depend on goal-directed processes that rely on previous knowl-
edge. The response accumulation process can be considered a
bottom-up process since it relies on sensory stimuli (Pessoa and
Ungerleider, 2004).
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
This section first describes the participants involved in the study
and the behavioral task they performed. The “Bayesian Model”
section then describes the assumed component processes under-
lying the task, and how the probability of them failing relates
to incorrect task performance. It also describes how the deci-
sion threshold for the accumulation process is adaptively switched
between low and high levels, and how reaction time is related to
this threshold. The section on “Model Likelihood” describes how
the experimental data (time series of error/correct outcomes and
reaction times) are related to model parameters such as mem-
ory integrity and decision thresholds. Finally, the “Model Fitting”
section describes how the model is fitted to the experimental data.
2.1. PARTICIPANTS
Fifteen native English speaking volunteers (aged 24.7± 4.1 years;
8 females) took part in the study. In addition to these partici-
pants three subjects were tested but excluded because of technical
failure or performance below chance-level. The participants all
gave written informed consent, and the study was approved by the
joint ethics committee of the Institute of Neurology and University
College London Hospital, London, UK.
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2.2. STIMULI AND TASK DESCRIPTION
Each subject took part in a total of six experimental sessions,
and each session comprised a priming part followed by a rule-
association part. We used a within-subject design where each
participant was primed both with associations to “clever” and
“stupid.” The order of the priming categories was counterbal-
anced between participants; the participants begun with either
three consecutive sessions that involved the “clever” prime or three
consecutive sessions that involved the “stupid” prime. The partic-
ipants were primed using the scrambled sentence task (Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000). In our study, each scrambled sentence consisted
of six words and participants judged whether or not it could be
made into a grammatically coherent sentence by using five of the
six words. The participants responded “yes” by pressing a button
corresponding to their right index finger or “no” by pressing a but-
ton corresponding to their right middle finger on a button-box.
Each sentence was presented for 8000 ms during which time the
participant had to respond. In each session, 70% of the sentences
had words that were synonyms for either “clever” or “stupid,” and
30% of the sentences were neutral. The neutral sentences were
introduced in accordance with the description of Bargh and Char-
trand (2000), with the aim to disguise the purpose of the language
task. Examples of sentences in the “clever” condition are “pupil
intelligent Todd and his pencil” and “the brightest nothing idea
everything promoted,” and examples of sentences in the “stupid”
condition are “welcome not morons one are here” and “the room
obtuse had white green.”
We measured the effect of the priming on response time (RT)
and error-rate on a computer-based rule-association task (Crone
et al., 2006) (Figure 1). In this task, participants were asked to
respond to targets that could be either “bivalent” or “univalent.”
Bivalent targets refer to visual targets that were associated with
different responses depending on which of two rules is currently
relevant. The outcome of the response target was to either press the
left or the right button. The univalent target was associated with
fixed responses. A rule cue was presented on a computer screen
for 1000 ms, this was followed by a blank screen for 500 ms before
the response cue appeared. A pause of 2000–8000 ms occurred
before the next rule cue was presented. For example, if the rule cue
consisting of four triangles (Figure 1) was followed by a butterfly
(response cue) the participant should press the right button on the
keypad, whereas if the star appeared as the rule cue (Figure 1) and
was followed by a butterfly (response cue) the participant should
press the left button. The task consisted of a distribution of 70%
bivalent cues and 30% univalent cues in randomized order, which
gives roughly the same number of presentations of each rule cue.
There was no particular hypothesis for modulation of expectancy.
We followed approximately the distribution used in Crone et al.
(2006).
Eight scrambled sentences were presented followed by a
sequence of 50 rule trials. This constitutes a session and there were
three consecutive sessions for each prime (clever and stupid). Prior
to data collection, participants practiced the rule task for 80 trials,
and the language task for 20 trials, with all the sentences being
of neutral character. The data was analyzed using custom writ-
ten Matlab scripts (Matlab r2010a, The Math Works, Natick, MA,
USA). The participants performed the task inside an fMRI-scanner
FIGURE 1 |The experiment consisted of two rule types: (A) and (B)
indicate the bivalent rule, (C) indicates the univalent rule. Participants
viewed the rule cue for 1 s. After a 0.5 s delay the target stimulus was
presented for 2.5 s. The response was either a left or a right button press,
depending on the relevant mapping that had been previously learnt.
and performed a second task after the above described paradigm
but these data will be presented elsewhere.
To disguise a link between the two tasks, we told the partici-
pants that we would alternate between a language task and a rule
task. Our explanation was that the experimenters had long expe-
rience of participants getting bored during experiments, and this
was a way to prevent this from happening. After the experiment
the participants were debriefed as to whether they thought any
of the tasks would influence performance on the other task, and
whether they noticed any theme in the sentences. The debrief-
ing was adapted from Bargh and Chartrand (2000) to fit with
the present tasks. None of the participants reported any link
between the two tasks. One participant reported that the sentences
had either a positive or a negative character, another participant
reported that some sentences had words related to “clever” in
them. However, none of these participants reported any under-
standing that one task would influence the other. Therefore, these
participants were included in the analysis. After the experiment
the participants also filled out the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale
(Rosenberg, 1965), which is a 10-item questionnaire measuring
the participant’s general explicit self-esteem, and the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) which consists
of 40 questions on anxiety.
2.3. BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
As mentioned in the Section “Introduction,” a delay in RT on a
correct trial after an error is often observed in cognitive task per-
formance, and is suggested to reflect participants’ control over
behavior (Rabbitt, 1966). In the present paper we consider two
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types of trials; correct following correct (CC) and correct following
error (EC). Reaction times on CC trials are referred to as RTs after
correct, and on EC trials as RTs after error. We do not consider
RTs on error trials themselves because generally these may vary
substantially, without known cause.
First we looked at the overall RTs for CC trials and EC trials
respectively. We then organized data from “early” and “late” trials
using an epoch length of N CC for CC trials and an epoch length
of N EC for EC trials. Here “epoch length” refers to the number of
trials that define the early and late periods. Fewer trials are used for
the EC category due to the smaller number of errors than corrects.
We present results obtained with N CC= 20 and N EC= 3 although
our effects are robust over a range of parameters. This means that
the first twenty CC trials of the first session were compared with
the last twenty CC trials of the third session for each priming cate-
gory (clever/stupid), and the first three EC trials of the first session
were compared to the last three EC trials of the third session for
each priming category. The data was compared using Student’s
paired t -tests.
We investigated accuracy for each priming category by comput-
ing the mean error rates in percent for each of the three sessions,
and made pairwise comparisons between sessions within a prim-
ing category as well as between priming categories using two-tailed
paired t -tests.
We also investigated whether there was any correlation between
RT and correct rate. RT was first aggregated over participants with
subject means subtracted. We then regressed these RTs onto error
rate, using data from sessions 1 and 3.
In addition, we investigated if there was any correlation between
scores on the psychometric questionnaires (Rosenberg’s self-
esteem questionnaire and the STAI) and the difference in error
rate between late and early sessions after “stupid”-priming, the
mean error-rate after “clever”-priming, as well as the difference in
RT between late and early sessions after “stupid”-priming.
2.4. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
2.4.1. Rule-association task
Here we describe a model of the bivalent trials of the rule-
association task. We focus on the bivalent, rather than the univalent
trials, as the latter were not affected by priming (see Results).
For the bivalent trials participants must remember and act on
a rule. For rule A, participants should press the left button when
the tree cue appears and the right button when the butterfly cue
appears. For rule B, participants should press the right button
when the tree cue appears and the left button when the butterfly
cue appears. Which rule is active is indicated by one of two rule
symbols presented earlier (Figure 1). Success requires that neural
circuits in the motor system integrate information from working
memory about which rule is active (A or B) with information from
the visual system about which cue is present (tree or butterfly). We
call these two processes “memory” and “response accumulation.”
The term accumulate refers to Evidence Accumulation (EA)-type
models established in decision theory in which evidence is accu-
mulated until a threshold is reached and an action is triggered
(Gold and Shadlen, 2001). These models are reviewed in Bogacz
et al. (2006). We denote successful rule memory with mt= 1 and
successful response accumulation with ct= 1 where t refers to trial
number. We denote the probabilities of these events as
p(mt = 1) = pi
p(ct = 1) = βt (1)
We also refer to pi as memory integrity. The quantity β t is also
referred to as the decision threshold (see below).
Both of the processes being correct leads to a correct outcome
on that trial, bt= 1. Importantly, we note that a correct outcome
can also be achieved by incorrect memory mt= 0 and incorrect
cue integration ct= 0, i.e., a “fluke.” If the two processes are inde-
pendent then the probability of the various combinations p(m, c)
follows from the standard rules of probability theory (Wackerly
et al., 1996) as shown in Figure 2. The probability of a correct
outcome is given by
rt = p(bt = 1)
= βtpi + (1− βt )(1− pi) (2)
We assume that our normative participant knows the outcome
of a trial. In our experiment no explicit feedback was given to
the participants as to whether they were correct or incorrect on
a given trial. However, on tasks that encourage quick responses
participants are often aware of making an error at the time they
respond (Rabbitt, 1966). We also know from imaging studies that
there is error related activation in the mid-anterior cingulate cortex
(mid-ACC) when people make errors without receiving external
feedback (Bengtsson et al., 2011). We therefore assume that the
normative subject has access to this information.
Our normative subject does not, however, know whether mem-
ory for the task or response accumulation were correct on that
trial. They can however infer the probabilities of these events using
Bayes rule (Bernardo and Smith, 1993). After a given outcome, the
probability that response accumulation was incorrect can be com-
puted. These posterior probabilities are given by Bayes rule and can
be read off from Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 | On each trial, memory m of the rule is either correct or
incorrect, and accumulation c is either correct or incorrect. The figure
shows the four possible combinations of these events. There are thus two
ways in which a correct outcome can be produced, and two ways in which
an incorrect outcome (error) can be produced. If pi is the probability of
correct memory, β the probability of correct integration, and these two
events are independent, then the probabilities of the joint events p(m, c)
are given as in the figure.
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p(ct = 0|bt = 0) = (1− βt )pi
(1− βt )pi + βt (1− pi) (3)
p(ct = 0|bt = 1) = (1− βt )(1− pi)
(1− βt )(1− pi)+ βtpi (4)
2.4.2. Adaptive decision threshold
A consistent finding in the decision-making literature is that indi-
viduals generally slow down their response following an error so
as to regain control over behavior (Rabbitt, 1966). In the context
of evidence accumulation models of decision making, one mech-
anism for delaying responses is to increase the decision threshold.
Indeed, the idea that decision thresholds are adaptively updated
has been explored in the decision-making literature (Bogacz et al.,
2006; Simen et al., 2009). These adaptive thresholding processes
have been studied in the context of simple two-alternative forced
choice (2AFC) tasks (for a review, see Bogacz et al., 2006). One
algorithm for adapting the decision threshold is to decrease it if
the previous trial was correct and increase it if the previous trial
was incorrect (Myung and Busemeyer, 1989). However, such an
approach is not straightforwardly implemented in more complex
decision tasks.
For example, in the rule-association task used in this paper,
an incorrect trial outcome may not be due to incorrect evi-
dence accumulation. An incorrect outcome may rather be due
to faulty working memory. Therefore, before deciding whether to
increase or decrease the decision threshold it is necessary to infer
whether the accumulation process was correct or incorrect. We
propose that, for normative subjects, this inference is made using
Bayes rule and refer to the resulting process as Bayesian Adaptive
Thresholding (BAT).
In this paper we use a simple two-state model for this adaption
process which provides two levels of decision threshold (or “accu-
mulation success”); low and high, denoted by β[1] and β[0]. If
response accumulation was inferred to be incorrect on the current
trial then the decision threshold for the next trial should assume
the high level. Similarly, if it was inferred to be correct then a low
threshold will be used on the following trial. This is the specific
BAT process assumed in this paper. The price to pay for using a
high threshold is that the response will be delayed and this relation
can be quantified using a reaction time model (see next section).
One might also conceive of a BAT process in which β t is contin-
uously updated. We have, however, focused on a discrete model
as it relates more directly to the behavioral results (specifically the
early to late double dissociation reported in Section 3.1.3).
To incorporate the adaptive threshold into our model we substi-
tute β t=β[ct-1] into equations (2–4). For example, the outcome
probability from equation (2) becomes
p(bt = 1|ct−1) = β[ct−1]pi + (1− β[ct−1])(1− pi) (5)
This shows that the outcome on the current trial depends on
whether participants believed response accumulation was success-
ful on the previous trial. In Section 2.5 below we show how this
relation can be used to write down the likelihood of an out-
come sequence. This quantity is necessary for estimating model
parameters from data.
2.4.3. Reaction time model
We use an Evidence Accumulation (EA)-like model to describe
the process of integrating working memory with sensory input
(Gold and Shadlen, 2001). EA or Drift Diffusion Models (DDMs)
describe how evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached
and then an action is triggered. Specifically, the quantity that is
accumulated is the log odds ratio, log p/[1− p] where p is the
probability with which it is believed one should make a specific
response (e.g., left button press). These models are known to be
optimal for 2AFC decision tasks (Bogacz et al., 2006). Gold and
Shadlen (2001) review a large body of work in which neural firing
rates on 2AFC tasks are seen to correlate with log odds ratios.
For the rule-association task employed in this paper it is not
clear, however, that such simple EA models are optimal. Recently
Yu et al. (2009) have described a normative model of the Eriksen
Flanker task, and in later work (Liu et al., 2009) they also provide
a connection to DDMs from which they derive semi-analytic for-
mulae for reaction times and error rates. We note that a similar
approach is possible for the bivalent rule-association task where,
mathematically, the rule cue rather than the flankers act as the
“context” variable. The univalent rule-association task is a 2AFC
task. Switching between the univalent and bivalent conditions
requires an additional task-switching process.
We have outlined how the above approach can be applied to
the rule-association task in ongoing, unpublished work (Bengts-
son and Penny, 2013). This has motivated us to assume that the
average reaction time is proportional to a log-odds ratio threshold
(this is the case for simple EA models and the approach described
in Bengtsson and Penny, 2013). That is, the likelihood of RT data,
y, is given by
p(yt |ct−1) = N (y ;µy , σy ) (6)
µy = µθT
θT = log
(
β[ct−1]
1− β[ct−1]
)
where µ is the evidence accumulation slope, and θT is the log-
odds ratio threshold. Larger β values produce higher θT’s and thus
longer RTs. The β[0] and β[1] values described earlier therefore
produce a short and a long average RT, as depicted in Figure 3.
2.4.4. Me-Focus
A complementary view on the inferential process subsequent to
an outcome is the extent of “me-focus.” This is the extent to which
a subject identifies themselves with the outcome of a trial. In our
experimental context we hypothesize that the self is most strongly
associated with the memory process. The extent of “me-focus” can
therefore be quantified by the probability p(mt= b|b). For correct
and incorrect outcomes these are given by
p(mt = 0|bt = 0) = βt (1− pi)
(1− βt )pi + βt (1− pi) (7)
p(mt = 1|bt = 1) = βtpi
(1− βt )(1− pi)+ βtpi (8)
We conclude this section with a brief summary of the model
assumptions. We have assumed (a) that our behavioral task
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FIGURE 3 | Figure showing evidence accumulation process and
how the decision threshold is changed from one trial to the next.
Here p is the probability of pressing the right button and log p/[1− p] is
the corresponding log odds ratio. In this example the decision
threshold has a low value on trial t, corresponding to p=β[1]. Evidence
is accumulated and a response is made when the threshold is reached,
at about 350 ms. After the response, an inference is made as to
whether response accumulation was correct on that trial (ct =1). If it
was deemed correct then the threshold remains low on the next trial.
Otherwise it is increased (corresponding to p=β[0]), resulting in a
longer RT on trial t +1. This process is referred to as Bayesian Adaptive
Thresholding.
embodies two processes (i) memory: remembering a rule for how
to behave and (ii) response accumulation: integrating stimuli with
rule memory to produce an appropriate response, (b) the deci-
sion threshold for the response accumulation process adapts over
trials by switching to a higher value if accumulation was inferred
to be incorrect on the previous trial, (c) mean reaction time is
proportional to a log-odds ratio (log β/[1−β]). The adaptive
thresholding procedure follows from an application of Bayes rule
(Bernardo and Smith, 1993) and the reaction time model is based
on similar properties of 2AFC (Bogacz et al., 2006) and contextual
decision-making tasks (Liu et al., 2009).
2.5. MODEL LIKELIHOOD
This section describes how the behavioral data on error rates and
reaction times can be related to model parameters such as memory
integrity and accumulation thresholds.
2.5.1. Outcome likelihood
The outcome on the current trial depends on whether we believed
accumulation was correct on the previous trial. This in turns
depends on the outcome of that trial and whether we believed
accumulation was correct on the trial before that. The probabil-
ity of an outcome sequence comprising, for example, T = 3 trials
b= {b1, b2, b3} is therefore given by the product
p(b|pi ,β) = p(b3|b2, b1)p(b2|b1)p(b1) (9)
where
p(b3|b2, b1) =
∑
c2
∑
c1
p(b3|c2)p(c2|c1, b2)p(c1|b1) (10)
p(b2|b1) =
∑
c1
p(b2|c1)p(c1|b1)
As the sequence grows in length one can see that computation
of the likelihood becomes exponentially expensive, because the
number of terms in equation (10) grows as 2(T − 1).
2.5.2. Low-order approximation of outcome likelihood
However, it turns out that these (T − 1)th-order conditional
probabilities can be adequately approximated by lower-order
conditional probabilities. We use the first order approximation
p(bt |bt−1, .., b1) ≈ p(bt |bt−1, ct−2 = 1) (11)
That is, by assuming that accumulation was correct on the trial
before last (its more likely to be correct than not, unless pi and
β are very low). Under this approximation the outcome on trial t
then depends on the outcome at t − 1 only
p(bt |bt−1, ct−2 = 1) =
∑
ct−1
p(bt |ct−1)p(ct−1|ct−2 = 1, bt−1)
(12)
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assuming c0= 1. The likelihood of a sequence of outcomes, b, is
then given by
p(b|pi ,β) ≈ p(b1)
T∏
t=2
p(bt |bt−1, ct−2 = 1) (13)
2.5.3. Joint likelihood
The likelihood of outcomes, RTs, and integration sequence is
given by
p(b, y , c |,pi ,β) =
T∏
t=1
p(bt |ct−1)
T∏
t=1
p(ct |ct−1, bt )
T∏
t=1
p(yt |ct−1)
(14)
From this we can compute the joint likelihood of outcomes
and RTs
p(b, y|,pi ,β) =
2T∑
i=1
p(b, y , ci |,pi ,β) (15)
and the likelihood of an integration sequence
p(ci |b, y ,pi ,β) = p(b, y , ci |,pi ,β)
p(b, y|,pi ,β) (16)
Equation (15) again involves an exponentially expensive sum-
mation. But we can use the same low-order approximation as
before, this time to approximate the joint likelihood. This lower-
order approximation has been validated by comparing exact and
approximate likelihoods on short data sequences (e.g., T = 10).
We have also generated synthetic data and found that the approxi-
mate likelihood is maximized by values that are very similar to the
true known parameter values.
2.5.4. Reaction time likelihood
We can integrate out the variable ct − 1 to see how reaction time
is dependent on the outcome of the previous trial (assuming that
integration was correct on the trial before that)
p(yt |bt−1, ct−2 = 1) =
∑
ct−1
p(yt |ct−1)p(ct−1|, ct−2 = 1, bt−1)
(17)
2.6. MODEL FITTING
The following model fitting procedure used a Bayesian estima-
tion algorithm (Gelman et al., 1995) to estimate model parame-
ters from behavioral data. The work in this paper is therefore
Bayesian in two ways (i) providing a computational model of sub-
ject behavior and (ii) estimating the parameters of that model
from data.
2.6.1. Fitting group data
We fit the Bayesian model to data from the group of participants
as follows. We focus on a main empirical finding of the paper; that
for the stupid prime, the RTs after correct responses are negatively
correlated with correct response rate (see Section 3.1.2). We used
the model to regress RTs y onto correct rates, r: first, we inverted
equation (2) to write pi as a function of β and r
pi(β, r) = min
(
1,
r − 1+ β
2β − 1
)
(18)
where the min operator is required to ensure that pi < 1. The value
of β to be used depends on whether or not response accumu-
lation was inferred to be correct on the previous trial. But for
the purpose of the group model fitting we used the approxima-
tion β =β1 (accumulation assumed correct on previous trial, i.e.,
ct − 1= 1). Second, we used equation (17) to relate β[1], β[0], µ,
and pi(β, r) to expected RT (this integrates over ct − 1 but assumes
ct − 2= 1). Model fit was then assessed using the squared differ-
ence between these expected RTs and the actual RTs. Log model
likelihood was defined equal to negative model error. We then
employed a Bayesian estimation procedure with uniform priors
p(β[1]) = U (0.5, 1) (19)
p(β[0]) = U (0.5, 1)
p(µ) = U (50, 1000)
where U (a, b) denotes a uniform density with minimum and max-
imum values a and b. The posterior parameter density p(β[1],
β[0], µ|y, r) was then estimated using a Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm (Gelman et al., 1995) with 20,000 iterations. The first
10,000 samples were discarded to accommodate burn-in effects.
The remaining 10,000 samples then comprise our approximation
to the posterior density.
2.6.2. Fitting individual subject data
We fitted the model to both RT and outcome data from the first and
last sessions. This was implemented separately for each subject and
type of priming (stupid or clever). The memory integrity variable
pi was allowed to be different for the two sessions;pi1 (first) andpi2
(last). The likelihood of a model was approximated as described
above. We then employed a Bayesian inference procedure with
uniform priors
p(pi1) = U (0, 1) (20)
p(pi2) = U (0, 1)
p(β[1]) = U (0.9, 0.94)
p(β[0]) = U (0.999, 1)
p(µ) = U (310, 420)
where the priors over β[1], β[0], and µ are constrained by the
results of the group analysis (see Section 3.2.3). The posterior para-
meter density was then estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm with 20,000 iterations. The first 10,000 samples were
again discarded to accommodate burn-in effects. We also com-
puted the posterior mean for each subject and type of priming
and used two-way paired t -tests to test whether memory integrity
varied over sessions. This was implemented separately for the stu-
pid and clever prime data. We hypothesize that priming affects
memory integrity.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 490 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bengtsson and Penny Self-associations influence task-performance
3. RESULTS
3.1. BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
We first analyzed the univalent trials, and found no significant
difference between the two primes in the number of errors; stu-
pid (6.9± 1.8) and clever (6.0± 0.6). All the data analyses and
modeling that follow therefore relate to the bivalent trials.
3.1.1. Error rates by session
When participants are primed “stupid” the mean error rates are
7, 12, and 18% for sessions 1–3. They are significantly differ-
ent between sessions 1 and 2 (p= 0.01, t = 2.98, df= 14), 2 and
3 (p= 0.02, t = 2.6, df= 14), and 1 and 3 (p< 0.01, t = 3.37,
df= 14). Thus, we observed that when “stupid”-associations are
evoked participants’ performance becomes increasingly worse
whereas when participants are primed “clever” the mean error
rates are 8, 9, and 8% for sessions 1–3 (no significant differences).
We refer to this as a confirmation bias. Additionally, we find that
only in session 3 are stupid error rates significantly higher than
clever error rates (p< 0.01, t = 3.54, df= 14). Boxplots of these
effects are shown in Figure 4. These effects remain significant if
the outlying participant (participant 10 – see small circles in top
row of Figure 4) is removed.
3.1.2. Stupid prime: reaction time versus error rate
Since we had observed that the correct rate was deteriorating
over time when participants had been primed stupid we inves-
tigated whether there was any correlation between RT and correct
rate for this condition. RT was first aggregated over partici-
pants with subject means subtracted. We then regressed these RTs
onto error rate, using data from sessions 1 and 3. For RT after
errors we obtained (r =−0.03, p= 0.81) and for RT after corrects
(r =−0.41, p= 0.001). For every percentage point decrease in cor-
rect rate there is a 5 ms increase in RT (after corrects). The same
pattern of results was found using data from all sessions and after
removing an outlying participant.
3.1.3. Reaction times in early versus late epochs
We now focus on the early and late epochs for both priming
conditions. The overall mean RT is 848 ms. RTs for clever are sig-
nificantly longer than for stupid (874 ms versus 822 ms, p= 0.03,
t = 2.03, df= 14). For EC trials there is a significant early to late
increase when participants are primed clever (p= 0.01, t = 2.4,
df= 14), but not when they are primed stupid (p= 0.22, t = 0.80,
df= 14). For CC trials there is a significant early to late increase
when participants are primed stupid (p= 0.03, t = 2.03, df= 14),
but not when they are primed clever (p= 0.39, t = 0.30, df= 14).
We refer to this as an early to late double dissociation. RTs for EC
and CC trials are shown in Figure 5.
It is only when looking at performance over time that we can
disentangle the differences between the two mental states. Looking
at the overall RTs for CC trials there was no significant difference
between stupid and clever (871 ms versus 905, p< 0.14, t = 1.09,
df= 29). For EC trials there was a trend for stupid being shorter
than clever (773 ms versus 842, p< 0.07, t = 1.51, df= 29).
3.1.4. Correlation between psychometric scores and behavior
We did not find any significant correlation between psycho-
metric scores and behavior. Difference in error rate between
late and early sessions after “stupid”-priming (Rosenberg:
r =−0.26, p= 0.36; STAI: r = 0.11, p= 0.71), the mean error-
rate after “clever”-priming (Rosenberg: r =−0.32, p= 0.25; STAI:
r =−0.42, p= 0.17), the difference in RT between late and early
FIGURE 4 | Confirmation bias. Boxplots of error rates over participants for
“stupid” prime (top row) and “clever” prime (bottom row). On each box, the
red line indicates the median, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th
percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points considered
not to be outliers, and outliers are plotted individually. The outlying data points
in the top row are all from participant 10.
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FIGURE 5 | Early to late double disocciation. (Left) RT (ms) after
errors. There is a significant early to late increase when participants are
primed “clever” (p=0.01, dotted line, *), but not when they are primed
“stupid” (p=0.22, solid line). (Right) Reaction times (ms) after
corrects. There is a significant early to late increase when participants
are primed “stupid” (p=0.03, solid line, *), but not when they are
primed “clever” (p=0.39, dotted line). Error bars indicate the standard
error of the mean.
sessions after “stupid”-priming (Rosenberg: r =−0.11, p= 0.71;
STAI: r = 0.24, p= 0.45).
3.2. MODELING RESULTS
We first present a number of qualitative features of the model, and
then make inferences about model parameters from data fitting.
3.2.1. Inferring faulty accumulation
Equations (3 and 4) give the probability of inferring that the
process of integrating the visual cue with memory for the rule
(the response accumulation process) was faulty, given an error
or a correct response on that trial. Figure 6 (Left) shows how
these two probabilities, p(c = 0|b= 0) and p(c = 0|b= 1), vary
with memory integrity, pi . From the red curve it can be seen
that participants will be more likely to attribute an error (b= 0)
to faulty response accumulation (c = 0) as pi increases. Simi-
larly, from the blue curve, we see they will be more likely to
attribute a correct response (b= 1) to faulty response accumu-
lation as pi decreases. If we assume that priming influences pi ,
and further that “stupid” priming reduces pi and “clever” priming
increases it, then the above mechanism will cause the double dis-
sociation observed in the early-late RT data. The negative slope
of the blue curve then provides a simple explanation of the
negative correlation between RT after corrects and correct rate
(see Section 3.1.2).
3.2.2. Me-focus
The extent of me-focus is quantified by the probability p(m= b|b),
given in equations (7 and 8), and shown in Figure 6 (Right), sub-
sequent to error outcomes (red curve) and correct outcomes (blue
curve). Increasingpi increases me-focus after correct and decreases
me-focus after error. Thus, when primed clever, the attribution of
an outcome to the self is increased after correct and decreased after
an error.
3.2.3. Fitting group data
We now focus again on a main empirical finding of the paper; that
for the stupid prime, the RTs after correct responses are negatively
correlated with correct response rate (see Section 3.1.2). We fitted
the computational model to this data by regressing RTs y onto
correct rates, r, as described in Section 2.6. A Metropolis-Hastings
procedure was used to obtain 10,000 samples from the posterior
density p(β[1], β[0], µ|y, r). Figure 7 shows 1000 samples from
this posterior; the ones that produce the best 10% of model fits.
The middle plot shows a negative posterior correlation between µ
and β[1]; i.e., the same model fit can be achieved by increas-
ing µ and decreasing β[1]. Nevertheless, we can be confident
that, e.g., 0.9<β[1]< 0.94 and 310<µ< 420. Importantly, we
can be highly confident that β[0]>β[1] indicating that inferred
faulty response accumulation does indeed cause an increase in
the decision threshold for the next trial. In what follows we use
the high probability parameter values β[1]= 0.92, β[0]= 0.9998,
and µ= 360.
3.2.4. Confirmation bias
If participants act as ideal Bayesian observers and update their
beliefs about pi then one will observe a confirmation bias effect.
For example, if priming acts to induce a prior distribution over pi
and this prior places more probability mass on smaller values of pi
than does the likelihood, then posterior values will be lower than
the maximum likelihood value. If this Bayesian updating mecha-
nism operates, e.g., between sessions then the performance in the
second session will be worse than in the first. In other words, if
you think you’re going to do badly then you will.
We provide a numerical example of confirmation bias based
on data from a single participant (participant 11). We used
outcome data b from the first session for when this partici-
pant was primed stupid. We used the β values obtained from
the group parameter estimation (previous section). The like-
lihood p(b|pi)= p(b|pi ,β) can be computed as described in
Section 2.5.
The temporal scale of hypothesized Bayesian updating in the
brain is unknown. It could happen discretely after each session
or may be a slow process that is continually in operation. In our
numerical example we compute the likelihood based on the first
10 outcomes only (9 of which were correct). This is for numer-
ical convenience only as this small number of outcomes allows
us to use the exact likelihood rather than an approximation to it
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FIGURE 6 | Inferring faulty accumulation (left) participants are more
likely to attribute errors (b=0) to incorrect accumulation (c =0) for
larger values of pi (red curve). Conversely, participants are more likely to
attribute correct responses (b=1) to incorrect accumulation for smaller
values of pi (blue curve). These curves were computed from equation (3)
(red) and equation (4) (blue) with a value of β t = 0.9. The blue and red
curves take on values 0 and 1 at pi = 1 (perfect rule memory). The value
1−β t determines the intercept at pi =0.5 and thus controls the gradient
of each of the above effects. Me-focus (Right) The extent of a subjects
“me-focus” is quantified by the probability p(m=b|b) shown here
subsequent to error outcomes, b=0 (red curve) and correct outcomes,
b=1 (blue curve).
FIGURE 7 | Estimated model parameters from fitting group data. The figures show samples from the bivariate posterior densities p(β[1], β[0]|b, y ) (left),
p(µ, β[1]|b, y ) (middle), and p(µ, β[0]|b, y ) (right). The color coding indicates model accuracy, with red indicating a better fit.
(see Section 2.5). This likelihood is plotted as the blue curve in
Figure 8.
We then hypothesize that the stupid prime takes the form of
the black curve in Figure 8. This was implemented using a beta
density (Bernardo and Smith, 1993). The posterior density p(pi |b)
is then computed using Bayes rule and is shown as the red curve,
which clearly exhibits a confirmation bias. The particular form of
the prior density here, e.g., beta density, is unimportant for our
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argument. As longs as the prior places more probability mass on
smaller values of pi than does the likelihood, a confirmation bias
will ensue.
3.2.5. Fitting individual subject data
We first present individual subject results for the three partici-
pants showing the largest confirmation bias effect (participants 2,
10, and 11). Figure 9 shows the posterior distributions for the pi1
and pi2 parameters. We can be confident that pi2<pi1 for each
participant. This shows that the confirmation bias effect is consis-
tent with a reduction in pi , i.e., is consistent with a priming effect
mediated by a change in pi .
FIGURE 8 | Confirmation bias. The black curve shows the prior p(pi ), the
blue curve the likelihood p(b|pi ), and the red curve the posterior p(pi |b). The
curves have been scaled (on the y -axis) for ease of comparison. If the prior
places more probability mass on smaller values of pi than does the
likelihood (e.g., through “stupid” priming) then the posterior will take on
lower values than the maximum likelihood value.
We then used a two-way paired t -test to test whether mem-
ory integrity varied over sessions for the group of 15 subjects.
This analysis was based on the posterior mean estimates of mem-
ory integrity. For the stupid prime data there was a significant
difference between sessions (mean pi1= 0.88, mean pi2= 0.80,
p= 0.02, t = 2.63, df= 14). For the clever prime data there was
no significant difference between sessions (mean pi1= 0.85, mean
pi2= 0.88,p= 0.25, t = 1.2,df= 14). This confirms our hypothesis
that priming affects memory integrity: stupid priming signifi-
cantly reduces pi whereas clever priming does not significantly
affect it.
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper we provide novel behavioral findings of how attention
to the cognitive task can be changed depending on which self-
concept is currently active in mind. We observed a double dissocia-
tion between outcome (errors/corrects) and prime (clever/stupid).
We augmented this finding by providing empirical evidence that
Bayesian principles can be applied to self-regulatory processes such
as “feeling stupid” and “feeling clever.” This strengthens the theory
that, in the healthy individual, inner standards of ability beliefs
are clearly defined structures (Kelly, 1955; Markus, 1977). Our
findings are important because they demonstrate that the way
self-concepts regulate behavior is based on the same general prin-
ciples that guide decision-making processes on many levels (Doya
et al., 2007).
Our model is simple in that it make use of two processes. One
process refers to remembering which rule is active. This is a work-
ing memory process and as such it is a top-down process. The
other process refers to the motor system integrating information
from working memory with information from the visual system
FIGURE 9 | Estimated model parameters from individual subject data. The figure shows the posterior densities p(pi 1 |b, y ) (top row for session 1) and
p(pi 2 |b, y ) (bottom row for session 3) for three participants.
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about which cue is present. The basic model then derives from
the logic of the experimental task, whereby the task can be imple-
mented correctly if both processes are either correct or if both
are incorrect. As these processes are correctly implemented with
some level of probability, Bayesian inference can be used to quan-
tify the effects of changing these probabilities. Additionally, the
model also incorporates an adaptive decision threshold based on
Bayes rule, whereby decision thresholds are increased if integra-
tion was inferred to be faulty. We refer to this as Bayesian Adaptive
Thresholding (BAT).
This paper hypothesized that priming affects the memory
process. We were able to test this hypothesis by fitting our com-
putational model to subjects’ behavioral data. Our results showed
that stupid priming significantly reduces memory integrity (pi)
whereas clever priming does not significantly affect it. The
Bayesian Adaptive Thresholding scheme, combined with the effect
of priming on memory, then explains a main experimental find-
ing of the paper; the early-to-late double dissociation in reaction
times.
When participants are primed “clever” and make an error they
are more likely to attribute the mistake to a fault in the motor-
integration process rather than the working memory process, and
will increase their decision threshold on the next trial so as to
increase the likelihood of correct evidence accumulation. This
naturally leads to a longer RT after an error response. Conversely,
following priming with associations to “stupid,” the participants
believe they have worse memory, and are therefore more likely
to attribute an error to a fault in the working memory process.
As a consequence, they will not increase their decision threshold
on the next trial and thus not delay RT. The uncertainty in top-
down processing seen for “stupid” makes them more likely than
those primed “clever” to attribute correct responses to a “fluke,”
in which both the working memory and the evidence accumula-
tion processes are considered faulty. They tend to increase their
decision threshold, and produce a longer RT on the next trial.
The lack of confidence in the participants’ memories after
“stupid”-priming also explains why if you think you are going to
do badly then you will (the confirmation bias); they should slow
down after making an error but do not, and so continue to make
errors. In other words, prior beliefs about performance are com-
bined with estimates of actual performance (the “likelihood”) to
set future levels of memory performance that are consistent with
both. Since the priming is implemented via this prior, if the par-
ticipants act as ideal Bayesian observers, their future performance
will be determined by how the prior is affected by the prime. When
participants have been primed “stupid” they place more probabil-
ity mass on smaller values of memory integrity. Since this prior
here places lower values on memory performance than does the
likelihood, the performance deteriorates over the course of the
experiment. This is analogous to leading psychological theories
of self-regulation which stipulate that for consistency and pre-
dictability of self the discrepancy between self-ability beliefs and
behavior is reduced (Bandura, 1982; Carver and Scheier, 1998).
These theories are based on numerous behavioral findings, one
example being an experiment where women who were told that
females perform badly on math tasks then went on to perform
worse than they would otherwise do (Spencer et al., 1999). We did
not observe a change in performance level after “clever”-priming
and suggest that this is because performance was commensurate
with their beliefs; they did well and expected to do so.
We find further that when participants are primed “clever” they
readily switch between attributing the cause of outcome to either
of the processes. When the same participants are primed with asso-
ciations of being “stupid” inferring the cause of outcome becomes
less distinct. A complementary view on the inferential process
subsequent to an outcome is the extent to which a participant
identifies themselves with the outcome of a trial. Since memory
integrity is in concordance with the influence of the prime it can be
assigned “me-focus.” The integration process on the other hand,
is a system which is not directly affected by priming, and can
therefore be interpreted as “task-focused.” When associations to
“clever” are active, in situations of making errors, the participants
will readily reduce their me-focus and place emphasis on task
processes; a mechanism that may reflect the discrepancy between
their expectation and their actual performance. When making
errors following “stupid”-priming the participants are more likely
to attribute errors to a faulty memory process, i.e.,me-focus,as well
as to think of correct responses as flukes. This finding is supported
by previous studies showing that depressed individuals (Greenberg
and Pyszczynski, 1986) and low self-esteem individuals (DiPaula
and Campbell, 2002) are more likely to persist in higher levels
of self-focus after failure over time. Our model assumes the exis-
tence of these two processes but we have not directly observed
them. The causes underlying the behavioral differences elicited
by our priming study can, more generally, be described in terms
of state characteristics and more enduring characteristics. Here
the enduring characteristics are defined as stable, relatively gen-
eral characteristics of the self that are consistent across situations,
whereas states are transient characteristics that can change from
moment to moment. Our model allows us to operationalize these
definitions such that the“state”corresponds to the inferred state of
the memory process (correct or not) and integration process (cor-
rect or not). The state thus changes from trial to trial. Whereas, the
more enduring characteristic corresponds to the subject’s mem-
ory integrity, which changes on a longer time scale (e.g., session to
session).
This paper has focused on the effect of priming on a very
specific behavior – performance in a rule-association task. How-
ever, we have reason to expect that our computational approach
will itself generalize, or can easily be generalized, to other behav-
iors. The core ideas of our approach are that (i) task performance
depends on two component processes: a memory process and an
evidence accumulation process, and that multiple combinations
of the component processes can produce a correct outcome (e.g.,
both correct or both incorrect) (ii) after a trial, Bayesian inference
is used to infer whether evidence accumulation was correct, and
the decision threshold for the next trial is set accordingly. This
model could be directly applied for example, to 1-back working
memory tasks (match current to previous item), or the AX contin-
uous performance tasks (press left if X follows A – the “target” is
AX, right otherwise; Braver and Cohen, 2000). For more complex
tasks such as n-back working memory (n> 1) one may conceive of
multiple memory processes (one for each of the n previous items)
instead of a single memory process. Or for the “12AX” task (if the
last numeral you saw was a 1, the target sequence is “AX,” if a 2
its “BY”; Frank et al., 2001) we may again need multiple memory
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processes (one for last letter, one for last numeral). Nevertheless,
for all of these cases, it will be possible to use Bayes rule to infer
whether the evidence accumulation process was correct and so
derive an appropriate Bayesian Adaptive Thresholding scheme.
One weakness of our study is that we did not use a reaction
time model derived from optimality principles, rather we simply
assumed that RTs were normally distributed with a mean reac-
tion time being proportional to the log-odds ratio of the decision
threshold. This is known to be a correct assumption for 2AFC tasks,
and the rule accumulation task (Bengtsson and Penny, 2013). Our
decision to use this rather simple model was motivated by the
fact that the focus of this paper is on between-trial rather than
within-trial dynamics (i.e., investigation of BAT scheme and effect
of priming). Nevertheless, it will be possible in future studies to
replace the simple Gaussian reaction time model with ones derived
from optimality principles. These are now available, for exam-
ple, for the Eriksen Flanker task (Liu et al., 2009), the Stop-Go
task (Shenoy and Yu, 2011), and we are currently working on the
rule-association task (Bengtsson and Penny, 2013).
The switching dynamics that our model portrays after “clever”-
priming resemble the pattern of transient brain activation of the
aMPC observed in Bengtsson et al. (2011) where activation goes
up for errors and down for correct responses when participants are
primed “clever.” It is interesting to note that the priming impacts
on the confidence in memory processes, which themselves are
processed on the aMPC (Summerfield et al., 2009). Our model
suggests that the enhanced activation seen in aMPC after “clever”-
priming when participants make errors reflects a switch away from
me-focus to task-focus. That this signal only occurs when there
is a positive expectation on performance is in line with findings
that this area is signaling errors when participants are more moti-
vated to do well on a task (Bengtsson et al., 2009), and when
the errors reinforce individuals’ optimism (Sharot et al., 2011).
Taken together, it suggests that self-related activation of aMPC
that occurs during errors reflects processes of discrepancies when
it is relevant to sustain positive aspects of self.
We have no direct evidence in this study that the priming actu-
ally targets self-concepts. According to the misattribution theory,
primes will target our self-concept if we put ourselves in focus.
This was empirically tested in a study where participants after trait-
priming were asked to focus either on themselves or on someone
else. In the self-focus condition the participants behaved in line
with the prime and explicitly rated themselves in line with the
prime, while these effects were absent in the other-focus condition
(DeMarree and Loersch, 2009). The double dissociation observed
in the present study between primes and the participants’ reac-
tions to their own outcome (errors/corrects) would be difficult
to explain if the prime simply targeted, e.g., semantic represen-
tations or associations to others, and supports the notion that in
our study the participants’ self-concept was affected. There are
studies showing a relationship between participants’ explicit self-
ratings and their implicit associations in that a conflict between
the two results in reduced task accuracy (Dislich et al., 2012)
or increased bias in judgments Bosson et al. (2003). We did not
find significant correlations between the psychometric scores and
our participants’ error-rate or RT. The lack of significant results
could be because explicit general self-esteem and reported anxiety
are aspects which do not impact on processes important for the
rule-switching task. In fact, Dislich et al. (2012) reported an inter-
action between implicit self-associations and explicit measures
concerning “intelligence” in particular, but not for self-esteem in
general.
In this paper we have highlighted the impact psychological
factors can have on decision-making systems. We find that a
contributing factor to optimal cognitive control is the implicit
associations that people make to themselves as being clever. Our
model suggests that these top-down associations regulate the effi-
ciency of attentional switching between one’s own abilities and the
task, as well as the confidence in one’s own memory processes.
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